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CONSENT BY REGISTRATION: THE “BACKDOOR THIEF”
Nate Arrington*
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider this personal jurisdiction quandary: A growing
Arizona company wants to start expanding into other states. The
company is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place
of business in Arizona. It decides to make the leap and begins
registering to do business in a few surrounding states, including
New Mexico. The registration seems straightforward and does
not mention anything about jurisdiction. After the registration,
but before conducting any business in New Mexico, a Kentucky
resident decides to sue the Arizona-based corporation. The suit
is based on an alleged tort occurring in Utah, and the plaintiff files
the lawsuit in New Mexico. According to current New Mexico
law, without any other contacts with the state, the New Mexico
court would have personal jurisdiction over the corporation.1
In several states, a corporation may be subject to personal
jurisdiction based purely on its registration, which leads to
inconsistent results and unfair rulings.2 Consequently, this
Article seeks to accomplish two goals. First, it will demonstrate
*
University of Arkansas School of Law, J.D. expected May 2021, Arkansas State
University, B.A. 2018. Many thanks to Professor Alan Trammell for his thoughtful
suggestions and guidance in reviewing prior drafts of this Comment. I am also indebted to
the helpful encouragement of Anna Van Der Like. Special thanks to my friends and family,
I could not have completed this without your support.
1. See Rodriguez v. Ford Motor Co., 458 P.3d 569, 581 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018); see also
Werner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 861 P.2d 270, 273-74 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).
2. See Bexis, Updating Our Post-Bauman 50-State Survey on General Jurisdiction by
Consent, DRUG & DEVICE L. BLOG (Nov. 5, 2018), [https://perma.cc/LAQ9-N6KZ] (fiftystate survey on the use of consent by registration).
For purposes of this Article, it is unimportant that only a minority of states may actually
allow consent by registration. Unless this practice is directly overruled or uniformly
abrogated, states will still have the ability to retroactively allow consent by registration at
any point, either through the legislative or judicial bodies.
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the current problems with the use of registration statutes to obtain
personal jurisdiction over defendants. These problems include
the broad nature of the consent, the lack of clarity on the effects
of registration, the use of coercion to obtain a business’s
registration, and the due process concerns following the U.S.
Supreme Court cases Goodyear3 and Daimler.4 These issues are
especially concerning when taking into consideration the
Supreme Court’s focus on fairness and reasonableness.5 Second,
this Article encourages courts to find solutions for obtaining
personal jurisdiction with the help of the Supreme Court’s
guidance without unfairly utilizing the conduit of a business’s
registration.
Part II discusses the evolution of personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence and the recent narrowing of both specific and
general jurisdiction. Through this narrowing, the Supreme Court
created a jurisdictional gap, leading courts to use other means of
obtaining personal jurisdiction. One method that has recently
received increased scrutiny is the practice of using a business’s
registration to serve as consent to personal jurisdiction.6 This Part
concludes with a historical discussion of the use of consent by
registration.
Part III analyzes the issues with the consent by registration
method without considering the due process implications. First,
this Part compares and contrasts the practice of consent by
registration with other accepted methods of consenting to
personal jurisdiction. Second, it examines the lack of clarity in
the registration statutes themselves as to the jurisdictional effects
of a business’s registration. Finally, this Part demonstrates that
these registration statutes and other state laws effectively coerce
companies into registering with the state, thereby casting doubt as
to the validity of the consent itself.
Part IV examines the due process concerns of consent by
registration following Goodyear and Daimler.7 This Article
argues that these two cases, especially Daimler, reject the idea
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011).
See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137-39 (2014).
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
See infra Part II.
Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919; Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137-39.
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that a corporation should be subject to general jurisdiction in
every state in which it does business.8 It then notes that using
consent by registration effectively circumvents Daimler’s
holding because, if consent by registration continues to be
allowed, a business will be subject to personal jurisdiction in any
state where it is registered.9 Finally, Part IV establishes that it is
impossible to reconcile the practice of consent by registration
with the ultimate touchstone of personal jurisdiction—fairness
and reasonableness.10
While the use of a business’s registration as consent to
personal jurisdiction made sense in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries,11 this practice is outdated and unworkable in
our modern global society. When considering the problems with
consent by registration in conjunction with the due process
concerns recently enunciated by the Court, a company’s
registration in the state should not be used as a conduit to obtain
personal jurisdiction over a defendant.12
II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION & HISTORY OF
CONSENT BY REGISTRATION
Personal jurisdiction is the court’s power “to assert judicial
authority over” a particular party, typically a defendant.13
Historically, personal jurisdiction was not a controversial or
contested area of the law, as courts used a territorial approach,
exemplified by the seminal case of Pennoyer v. Neff.14 This
territorial approach stood for the principle that “every State
possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and
property within its territory” and that a state does not have
jurisdiction over defendants not within its territory.15 However,
8. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137-39.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
11. States would allow the registration to serve as a proxy for presence in the era
dominated by the territorial approach to personal jurisdiction. See Brown v. Lockheed
Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 632 (2d Cir. 2016).
12. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137-39; Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919.
13. 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S MANUAL: FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 6.01 (2020).
14. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
15. Id. at 722.

774

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73:4

this approach proved insufficient in a modern, more mobile
society.
As the national and global economies became
increasingly interdependent, the courts shifted away from a
territorial approach of personal jurisdiction in favor of a disputebased approach rooted in notions of fundamental fairness.16 In
1945, the Supreme Court outlined this new approach to personal
jurisdiction in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, basing
personal jurisdiction on the location of the dispute itself and not
purely on the defendant’s location.17 Since then, two distinct
types of personal jurisdiction have emerged: specific jurisdiction
and general jurisdiction.18
Specific jurisdiction is found explicitly in International Shoe
and applies to causes of action that directly arise from contacts
within the forum state.19 The test used for specific jurisdiction
examines a defendant’s “minimum contacts” with the forum state
and whether the lawsuit “offend[s] ‘traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.’”20 Specific jurisdiction allows lawsuits
from a particular party that assert a particular cause of action.21 If
the defendant’s contacts in the dispute meet the “minimum
contacts” standard, the court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over the defendant.22
The second type of personal jurisdiction, general
jurisdiction, also derives from International Shoe.23 General
jurisdiction, intended to mimic presence within a state, relates to
disputes where the defendant’s activities within the forum state
are “continuous and systematic” in a manner that renders the
defendant subject to the authority of the forum state.24 This type
of jurisdiction, sometimes referred to as “all-purpose
16. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
17. See id. at 319.
18. Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966) (introducing the concepts of
specific and general jurisdiction to the personal jurisdiction doctrine).
19. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319; see also von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 18, at
1136.
20. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
21. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011).
22. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316; see, e.g., Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014).
23. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317; see also von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 18, at
1136.
24. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317.
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jurisdiction,” vests the court with personal jurisdiction over the
defendant in any lawsuit from any plaintiff.25 In other words,
general jurisdiction would confer personal jurisdiction regardless
of whether the claim arose from within the forum state or whether
the plaintiff resides in the forum state.26
International Shoe and later Supreme Court decisions rooted
the concept of personal jurisdiction in “traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.”27 In World-Wide Volkswagen, the
Court expanded on the role fairness and reasonableness play in
personal jurisdiction analysis, elucidating a four-factor test.28 The
Court has continued to reaffirm the importance of fairness and
reasonableness in evaluating personal jurisdiction.29 This
fairness doctrine, while sometimes neglected by courts, should
always be used as a touchstone in informing a personal
jurisdiction analysis.30
However, since International Shoe, the Court has
significantly reduced the scope of specific jurisdiction by adding
additional requirements to the two-part analysis discussed
above.31 One example includes requiring the defendant to
“purposefully avail[] itself” to the benefits of the forum state.32
In the last decade, after failing to address it for twenty-seven
years, the Court narrowed the scope of general jurisdiction,

25. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919.
26. See id.
27. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940));
see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (articulating
factors for evaluating the fairness of exerting personal jurisdiction).
28. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. The Court listed four factors in
evaluating fairness: (1) “the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute,” (2) “the
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief . . . at least when that interest
is not adequately protected by the plaintiff’s power to choose the forum,” (3) “the interstate
judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies[,]” and
(4) “the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies[.]” Id. (internal citations omitted).
29. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1985); Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987).
30. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463) (1940)).
31. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475; see also Alan M. Trammell, A Tale of Two
Jurisdictions, 68 VAND. L. REV. 501, 509 (2015).
32. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475; see also Trammell, supra note 31, at 509.
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especially in regard to corporations.33 The Court did this in two
cases, Goodyear and Daimler, in which it limited the states where
personal jurisdiction can be properly asserted to: (1) the
corporation’s principal place of business, (2) its incorporation
state, or (3) where the corporation is “essentially at home.”34
These increased jurisdictional requirements have functionally led
to a narrowing of personal jurisdiction both for specific and
general jurisdiction.
This narrowing of specific and general jurisdiction has
created a jurisdictional vacuum that courts are attempting to fill
through other means. Prior to Goodyear and Daimler, courts
were filling the vacuum left by this narrowing primarily through
expanding the scope of general jurisdiction.35 But since
Goodyear and Daimler, some courts have been relying on other
workarounds of the jurisdictional vacuum, including using a
business’s registration as consent to personal jurisdiction.36
Consent by registration comes from a relatively simple
concept. Every state has adopted a registration statute.37
Typically, these registration statutes require the company to
appoint a registered agent for service of process.38 Courts use
either the registration to transact business or the appointment of a
registered agent as evidence of consent to personal jurisdiction;
functionally, however, there is no difference in the analysis
because registration statutes require both the registration and the
appointment to fully register as a foreign corporation.39
33. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011);
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
34. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919, 924; see also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117,
137 (2014).
35. Trammell, supra note 31, at 511-12.
36. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 384 F. Supp. 3d 532, 534
(E.D. Pa. 2019); In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., MDL No. 2591, 2016 WL
1047996, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 11, 2016); Rodriguez v. Ford Motor Co., 458 P.3d 569, 581
(N.M. Ct. App. 2018).
37. Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 640 (2d Cir. 2016); Gulf Coast
Bank & Tr. Co. v. Designed Conveyor Sys., LLC, Civ. Action No. 16-412-JJB-RLB, 2017
WL 120645, at *3 (M.D. La. Jan. 11, 2017).
38. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1503(a)(5) (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-20105 (2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-1503(a)(v) (2009).
39. See Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1197-98 (8th Cir. 1990);
see also, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1503(a)(5); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-20-105; WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 17-16-1503(a)(v).
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In the pre-International Shoe era, the Supreme Court
recognized consent by registration, holding in Pennsylvania Fire
Insurance that a business assumed “the risk of the interpretation
that may be put upon [the state’s registration statute] by the
courts.”40 The Supreme Court reasoned that the business’s
“voluntary act” of appointing an agent for service of process
demonstrated consent to the jurisdiction of the forum state.41
Even after International Shoe, lower courts continued the practice
of allowing a company’s registration to serve as consent to
general jurisdiction.42 In permitting registration to confer
personal jurisdiction, courts have adopted various arguments.43
However, the majority of courts that have allowed consent by
registration primarily rely on the idea that the business is
consenting to personal jurisdiction by registering in the state or
appointing a registered agent.44
One illustrative case is Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc.45
There, the Eighth Circuit reversed a trial court ruling that did not
permit consent by registration.46 In allowing the corporation’s
registration to serve as consent to personal jurisdiction, the
Knowlton court reasoned that the Minnesota Supreme Court had
interpreted their State’s registration statute to provide consent to
personal jurisdiction by registering.47 Thus, by registering (and
thereby appointing a registered agent) in Minnesota, the
defendant had impliedly consented to personal jurisdiction.48 The
40. Pa. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 96 (1917).
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Sternberg v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1107 (Del. 1988); STX Panocean
(UK) Co., Ltd. v. Glory Wealth Shipping Pte. Ltd., 560 F.3d 127, 131 (2d Cir. 2009); Bane
v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637, 640-41 (3d Cir. 1991).
43. One argument states that a business registering in that state qualifies as “minimum
contacts” with the forum state. See Price v. Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Tr. Co., 460 N.E.2d
264, 269 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983); Junction Bit & Tool Co. v. Institutional Mortg. Co., 240
So.2d 879, 882 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970). This analysis confuses the tests for specific and
general jurisdiction and is “functionally . . . resting its analysis on consent” alone, just
through another name. Tanya J. Monestier, Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and
the Fallacy of Consent, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1343, 1372-77 (2015).
44. See, e.g., Sternberg, 550 A.2d at 1107; STX Panocean, 560 F.3d at 131; Bane, 925
F.2d at 640.
45. Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1990).
46. Id. at 1200.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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court stated that “[o]ne of the most solidly established ways of
giving such consent is to designate an agent for service of process
within the State.”49 The court infers this consent to general
jurisdiction by reasoning that it is unnecessary for a foreign
corporation to be mandated to register an agent for service if the
corporation is not subject to the personal jurisdiction of the
state.50
Before Goodyear and Daimler, the use of consent by
registration was not a significant issue, as courts would generally
bypass the narrowing of specific jurisdiction by expanding the use
of general jurisdiction.51 But since the narrowing of general
jurisdiction in Goodyear and Daimler, courts have been forced to
turn to other methods of obtaining personal jurisdiction, such as
consent by registration.52
III. ISSUES WITH THE USE OF CONSENT BY
REGISTRATION
While the use of consent by registration has become
increasingly tenuous following the due process concerns outlined
in Daimler and Goodyear,53 the practice of consent by registration
has significant issues by itself aside from the due process
concerns. Part III will consider these problems, namely (A) the
broad nature of consent by registration when that consent extends
to general jurisdiction, (B) the registration statutes’ lack of clarity
on the jurisdictional effects of registration, and (C) the coercion
on foreign businesses to register through harsh penalties.

49. Id. at 1999.
50. Knowlton, 900 F.2d at 1999.
51. See, e.g., Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1175 (9th Cir.
2006) (holding assertion of general jurisdiction reasonable where the defendant engaged in
political and social activity in the forum state).
52. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Ford Motor Co., 458 P.3d 569, 581 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018);
Forest Labs., Inc. v. Amneal Pharm. LLC, Civ. Action No. 14-508-LPS, 2015 WL 880599,
at *12 (D. Del. Feb. 26, 2015).
53. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011);
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137-39 (2014); see also, e.g., Brown v. Lockheed
Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 641 (2d Cir. 2016); Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123,
148 (Del. 2016).
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A. Difference between Consent to Specific Jurisdiction and
General Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court has long permitted a defendant to
expressly or implicitly consent to personal jurisdiction.54 There
are two widely accepted methods of giving consent to personal
jurisdiction: actual submission to a court’s authority and consent
through a forum selection clause in a contract.55 When compared
to these two methods of obtaining consent from a defendant,
consent by registration stands out as an overly broad and unfair
method of obtaining consent to personal jurisdiction.
The first and most widely accepted method of consenting to
personal jurisdiction is the defendant’s act of submission to the
court’s authority.56 Similar to a waiver, a defendant may submit
to a court’s authority by making an appearance in the court.57 For
example, the Seventh Circuit stated that, in evaluating whether a
defendant has consented by submission to the court’s authority,
the “defendant must give a plaintiff a reasonable expectation that
it will defend the suit on the merits or must cause the court to go
to some effort that would be wasted if personal jurisdiction is later
found lacking” in order “[t]o waive or forfeit a personal
jurisdiction defense[.]”58 In submission cases, a defendant knows
with a great degree of particularity both the party that initiated the
lawsuit and the nature of the claim made against him before
deciding to submit to the court’s authority.59 After all, a
defendant cannot legally contest any facts or claims in a particular
lawsuit prior to the lawsuit being initiated by a known party with
a specific claim against the defendant.
The second relatively uncontroversial method of consent to
personal jurisdiction is consent by contract through forum
54. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985) (“[A]
litigant may give ‘express or implied consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court.’”); Ins.
Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703-04 (1982).
55. Monestier, supra note 43, at 1380-81.
56. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880 (2011) (“A person may
submit to a [s]tate’s authority in a number of ways. There is, of course, explicit consent.”).
57. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Williams, 417 P.3d 1033, 1045 (Kan. 2018).
58. Mobile Anesthesiologists Chi., LLC v. Anesthesia Assocs. of Hous. Metroplex,
P.A., 623 F.3d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 2010).
59. See id.; Monestier, supra note 43, at 1383.
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selection clauses, which occurs when a party negotiating a
contract includes a clause limiting the forum where a lawsuit may
be sustained.60 For example, whenever negotiating a commercial
contract, Apple Inc. may include an enforceable forum selection
clause that requires all claims arising from the contract to be
litigated in California.61 This clause has the effect of obtaining
express consent from both contracting parties to litigate any
disputes in a particular forum or a limited number of forums.62
Notably, while these clauses are generally held enforceable and
controlling,63 they are not inherently valid where the forum
selection clause is unreasonable.64 Many courts employ a specific
analysis when determining whether a forum selection clause is
valid and enforceable.65 However, similar to the submission
method, even if a court finds a forum selection clause enforceable
and the party’s consent to personal jurisdiction valid, the consent
obtained through this clause still deals with a known party in
regard to a specifically contemplated dispute.66
In stark contrast stands the problematic consent by
registration. Unlike the consent obtained through submission and
forum selection clauses, parties who register to do business
engage with the forum state itself, without any knowledge of the
type of disputes that could arise or the parties that would file suit
against them.67

60. Monestier, supra note 43, at 1380.
61. Dace Int’l, Inc. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 275 Ill. App. 3d 234, 242 (1995).
62. See id. at 236-37.
63. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985); Atl. Marine
Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 571 U.S. 49, 63 (2013).
64. Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
65. See Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 2014) (analyzing a
forum selection clause using a four-part test involving (1) notice to the parties, (2) “whether
the clause is ‘mandatory or permissive,’” (3) whether the claims arose under the
clause/contract, and (4) whether the enforcement of the clause would be substantially
unreasonable or inconvenient); Wong v. PartyGaming, Ltd., 589 F.3d 821, 828 (6th Cir.
2009) (analyzing a forum selection clause using three factors: (1) whether the contract
process was flawed, (2) whether the chosen forum would be unfair, and (3) whether the
chosen forum would be substantially inconvenient).
66. See Hunter v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 863 F. Supp. 2d 190, 201 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)
(“A company’s submission to jurisdiction and service of process in New York pursuant only
to isolated contracts does not thereby signal its unrestricted consent to personal jurisdiction
in New York for all future claims brought against it.”).
67. Monestier, supra note 43, at 1383-84.
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In other words, both submission and forum selection clauses
are similar to consenting to specific jurisdiction, while consent by
registration infers consent to general jurisdiction.68 In the case of
submission, the consenting party knows the party making a claim
against him and the nature of the specific claim.69 In the case of
forum selection, while the consenting party may not know the
exact claim that would be made against him, the consenting party
knows the other party that would make the claim and that the
claim relates to or arises under the disputed contract.70 However,
when considering consent by registration, the registering
corporation knows neither the party that would make the claim
against it nor the alleged claim.71 Consent by registration opens
the consenting party up to lawsuits from any party concerning any
dispute, regardless of whether the claim relates to the forum state
or not.72 It is the broad nature of this consent that distinguishes
consent by registration from consent by submission and consent
by forum selection clause.
Consent by registration is the only method that allows
consent to general jurisdiction.73 And, as will be discussed in
more detail below,74 the alleged consent obtained through
registration may not be truly genuine to begin with. Consent by
registration should not be permitted when considering the
overarching and broad consequences involved, especially given
that the only other methods of consenting to personal jurisdiction
concern more specific and particularized circumstances.

68. Id.
69. See id.
70. See Hunter, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 201 (“A company’s submission to jurisdiction and
service of process in New York pursuant only to isolated contracts does not thereby signal
its unrestricted consent to personal jurisdiction in New York for all future claims brought
against it.”).
71. See Monestier, supra note 43, at 1384.
72. See, e.g., Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 632 (2d Cir. 2016)
(Alabama resident claiming negligence against a Maryland corporation in Connecticut
federal court).
73. Monestier, supra note 43, at 1384.
74. See infra Part III.B-C.
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B. Registration Statutes Are Unclear or Vague
Even if one believes courts should allow this broad implied
consent by registration, the current statutes are likely too vague to
support an inference of consent. These statutes’ lack of clarity
has led commenters to question whether foreign businesses are
sufficiently on notice in order to provide valid consent.75 Only
two states—Kansas76 and Pennsylvania77—have statutes
requiring explicit consent to personal jurisdiction through a
foreign corporation’s registration. All other state registration
statutes are silent as to the jurisdictional effects of registering as
a foreign company.78 In a typical registration statute, standard
language includes: “[a] foreign corporation may not transact
business in this state until it obtains a certificate of authority from
the Secretary of State.”79 While the statutes generally go on to
define the term “transacting business[,]” these statutes do not
mention the jurisdictional effects of registering.80
This silence in the registration statutes fails to put a foreign
corporation on notice that the registration may serve as consent to

75. See Monestier, supra note 43, at 1382-83.
76. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7931 (2016). Subsection (g) requires the registering foreign
corporation to attach an “irrevocable written consent” to personal jurisdiction as part of the
corporation’s registration application. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7931.It should be noted that
commentators are not in agreement as to whether Kansas’ statute gives explicit consent. See
Monestier, supra note 43, at 1368 n.121 (arguing that the language of the statute is subject
to other plausible interpretations, such as that the statute only gives consent to service of
process). This Article, however, will treat the Kansas statute as giving explicit consent, as
the Kansas Supreme Court held that the statute gives explicit consent. Merriman v.
Crompton Corp., 146 P.3d 162, 171-77 (Kan. 2006). Further, the statute requires the
registering corporation to affirmatively give “an irrevocable written consent . . . that actions
may be commenced against it in the proper court of any county where there is proper venue
by the service of process on the secretary of state . . . and stipulating and agreeing that such
service shall be taken and held, in all courts, to be as valid and binding as if due service had
been made upon the [officers] of the . . . entity.” KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7931(g).
77. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5301 (1981) (Subsection (a)(2)(i) allows Pennsylvania courts
to have personal jurisdiction over corporations “[i]ncorporat[ed] under or qualifi[ed] as a
foreign corporation under the laws of [Pennsylvania.]”). Notably, while the language does
provide explicit notice to registering foreign corporations, this language is not located in the
registration statute, potentially creating a notice issue even in an explicit consent jurisdiction.
78. Monestier, supra note 43, at 1387.
79. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1501(a) (1987).
80. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1501(b); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-17-1 (1975);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-920(b) (2014).
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personal jurisdiction in the state.81 If a corporation does not know
that registration could serve as consent to personal jurisdiction,82
then the consent itself is suspect. How can consent be genuine if
the party lacks any kind of notice that it is giving consent?83
Some courts have argued that, while the corporation has no
actual notice of the jurisdictional effects of registration, the
corporation does not need actual notice or may even have
constructive notice of the effects of registration.84 This reasoning
is founded in the idea articulated by the Supreme Court preInternational Shoe that the registering corporation “takes the risk
of the interpretation that may be put upon it by the courts.”85
Several courts have used this notion to support the idea that the
corporation consented to the state’s personal jurisdiction, even
where there was no notice to the corporation prior to its
registration.86 This reasoning, however, ignores two significant
issues. First, this argument relies on retroactive implicit consent.
Second, this language comes from a pre-International Shoe
decision that the Court has not since reexamined.87
In the foremost article on consent by registration, Professor
Tanya Monestier noted the problem of a corporation’s registration
providing retroactive consent without being given notice:
[T]his notion of consent is contradictory, because it
premises jurisdiction on the corporation’s prior consent,
but then holds that the scope of this consent will not be
established until the state court has interpreted the
registration statute. In other words, this conception

81. See Monestier, supra note 43, at 1387-88.
82. Especially when considering the consent is to a broader and more overarching type
of personal jurisdiction. See infra Part III.A.
83. This lack of notice could also raise procedural due process issues, as the registering
corporation loses the right to contest personal jurisdiction in the forum state without any
notice that the corporation has lost this right. See generally Robin J. Effron, The Lost Story
of Notice and Personal Jurisdiction, 74 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 23 (2018).
84. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Ford Motor Co., 458 P.3d 569, 581 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018);
Forest Labs., Inc. v. Amneal Pharm., LLC, Civ. Action No. 14-508-LPS, 2015 WL 880599,
at *12 (D. Del. Feb. 26, 2015).
85. Pa. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 96 (1917).
86. See, e.g., Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1200 (8th Cir. 1990);
Werner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 861 P.2d 270, 273 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).
87. See Pa. Fire Ins., 243 U.S. at 96.
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forces a foreign corporation to agree to a condition
before that condition has been established.
Consent must mean that one knows what one is
consenting to. This is especially the case when one’s
actions are retroactively deemed to constitute consent
to something.88
This implicit consent relies on the presumption that if a
corporation appoints a registered agent for service of process,
then the corporation implicitly accepts service, and therefore
personal jurisdiction, for any lawsuits served to that agent.89 The
Eighth Circuit has stated “[t]he whole purpose of requiring
designation of an agent for service is to make a nonresident suable
in the local courts[,]” and, therefore, a company’s appointment of
a registered agent confers consent to personal jurisdiction.90
However, states originally used business registration as a method
of mimicking presence in the era dominated by the territorial
approach to personal jurisdiction.91 This presence imitation
allowed the forum state to point to the business’s acceptance of
process through its appointed agent as evidence that the
corporation had affirmatively consented to jurisdiction in the
state.92 In an era dominated by territorial thinking, courts needed
to use this consent/presence argument to exert any reasonable
authority over foreign companies.93 However, continuing a
practice that courts used in the pre-International Shoe territorial
era seems unwise.94 The Eighth Circuit’s reasoning also ignores
the important consideration that registering corporations are
effectively coerced into registering an agent, a distinction that will
be explored in more depth later in this Article.95
Further, even if there is a prior case allowing consent by
registration that could serve as constructive notice to the foreign
corporation, this would not serve as sufficient notice that a
88. Monestier, supra note 43, at 1389.
89. Knowlton, 900 F.2d at 1199.
90. Id.
91. See Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 632 (2d Cir. 2016).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 138 n.18 (2014).
95. See infra Part III.C; see also Carol Andrews, Another Look at General Personal
Jurisdiction, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 999, 1074-75 (2012).
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corporation consents to personal jurisdiction by registering to do
business in a state.96 Often, these courts point to solitary lower
court opinions to support the notion of constructive notice.97 This
should not qualify as sufficient notice to foreign corporations for
multiple reasons.
First, courts often decided these older decisions prior to the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Goodyear and Daimler.98 It would
not be unreasonable for a foreign corporation to surmise that these
recent Supreme Court decisions significantly changed the validity
of these prior cases. This is especially true given that these
Supreme Court decisions did change the use of consent by
registration in several states.99 Second, the registration statute
itself gives no actual notice to foreign corporations of the
jurisdictional effects of registration.100 This contravenes Supreme
Court precedent stating parties must “have ‘fair warning that a
particular activity may subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a
foreign sovereign[.]’”101 Using older, pre-Daimler intermediate
appellate decisions as a form of constructive notice in lieu of any
type of notice in the registration statute itself does not seem to
meet the standard of a sufficient “fair warning” under Supreme
Court precedent.102
Some courts have observed this lack of notice issue when
ruling to discontinue the use of consent by registration.103 For
instance, in Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., the Second Circuit
compared Connecticut’s registration statute to Pennsylvania’s.104
96. See Brown, 814 F.3d at 634-35, 637, 641; see also Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137
A.3d 123, 125-26, 148 (Del. 2016).
97. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Ford Motor Co., 458 P.3d 569, 581 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018)
(citing a twenty-six-year-old New Mexico Court of Appeals case allowing consent by
registration); see also Brown, 814 F.3d at 634-35, 641 (analyzing a Connecticut Appellate
Court decision allowing consent by registration and declining to allow consent by
registration without direct judicial authority from the Connecticut Supreme Court).
98. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 458 P.3d at 581 (relying on a New Mexico Court of Appeals
case from 1993); see also Brown, 814 F.3d at 634-35 (analyzing a Connecticut Appellate
Court opinion from 2009).
99. See, e.g., Brown, 814 F.3d at 641; Genuine Parts, 137 A.3d at 148.
100. See Monestier, supra note 43, at 1366, 1368.
101. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (citing Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
102. Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also Rodriguez, 458 P.3d at 581.
103. See, e.g., Brown, 814 F.3d at 637; Genuine Parts, 137 A.3d at 136.
104. Brown, 814 F.3d at 637.
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In holding that consent by registration was no longer a valid
practice in the Second Circuit, the Brown court stated the
Connecticut statute “gives no notice to a corporation registering
to do business in the state that the registration might” be used as
consent for personal jurisdiction.105
If a foreign corporation registers under a statute that does not
explicitly give notice to the corporation of the jurisdictional
effects of registering, courts should not impute onto the
corporation implicit consent to personal jurisdiction. Further,
even a statute that expressly states the jurisdictional effects may
be improperly coercing that consent from the corporation or
violating the Supreme Court precedent set by Goodyear and
Daimler.106
C. Registration May Be Coerced
Even assuming a statute is unambiguously clear on the
jurisdictional effects of registration and provides explicit consent
from the foreign corporation, that consent may still not be genuine
due to the coercive nature with which states obtain registration
from a foreign corporation. First, given that an overwhelming
majority of states do not have an explicit consent statute, these
states obtain the registration without giving any notice to the
registering corporation.107 Second, even in explicit consent
jurisdictions, states create and enforce significant penalties for
foreign companies doing business in the state without properly
registering.108
As discussed above, nearly every state’s registration statute
fails to discuss the jurisdictional effects of registration and fails
to give foreign corporations adequate notice of the jurisdictional
consequences of registration.109 While this lack of notice casts
doubt on the validity of the consent by itself, this problem is
105. Id.
106. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137-39 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011).
107. See supra Part III.B.
108. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1502 (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 378
(2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-17-20 (1978); see also Andrews, supra note 95, at 1074-75.
109. Every state other than Kansas and Pennsylvania has a registration statute that
gives no explicit notice. See supra Part III.B.
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compounded by the coercive effects of failing to give notice. If a
foreign company is required to register with the state before
transacting any business and the company is not properly
informed of the consequences of registering, then the state is
engaging in coercive actions by deeming that registration to
implicitly give consent to personal jurisdiction in that state.110 As
noted by commentators, neither the registration statutes
themselves111 nor the required paperwork for registering112
require the business to give any level of consent to personal
jurisdiction. When the state fails to give proper notice of consent
by registration to foreign companies, it fails to inform the
companies of all the relevant facts in making the decision to
register. Therefore, to some degree this failure to inform coerces
a business into making the decision to register.113
Even in explicit consent jurisdictions, states may also engage
in coercive conduct by penalizing foreign corporations for failing
to register in the state.114 Every state has codified penalties for
companies conducting business in the state without registering.115
While there is some variance among the states as to what the
particular penalties are, these penalties typically “include an
inability of the defendant to sue in the state’s courts, the payment
of a fine, and the tolling of the statute of limitations against the
corporation.”116
These legal penalties leave a foreign company with only
three options: (1) do not register and do not transact any business
in the state, (2) conduct business in the state without registering
with the state, or (3) register and transact business within the state.
The first option is economically inefficient, as it directly
discourages companies from expanding into other states. The
second option subjects the corporation to legal penalties such as

110. Monestier, supra note 43, at 1399.
111. Id. at 1387-88.
112. Id. at 1396.
113. See Andrews, supra note 95, at 1074-75.
114. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1502 (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 378
(2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-17-20 (1978).
115. See Monestier, supra note 43, at 1365-66 & n.116; see also, e.g., ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-27-1502; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 378; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-17-20.
116. Monestier, supra note 43, at 1366.
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fines and the inability to sue in the state’s courts.117 The third
option allows the corporation to transact business in the state
without fear of legal penalties from the state; however, it also
subjects the corporation to general jurisdiction.118
None of these options are particularly advantageous to a
business considering registering in a state. Further, the decision
to register can create economically inefficient results. There are
two possibilities depending on whether the corporation is on
notice of the jurisdictional effects of registration. The first
possibility assumes that the corporation is on notice of these
jurisdictional effects. In this scenario, the business is less likely
to expand into other states due to the broad nature of consent by
registration, thereby discouraging economic expansion and
growth.119 Some companies have attempted to argue that this
economic interference violates the dormant Commerce Clause
with varying results.120 This argument is not often used and is
still an evolving area of the law with conflicting outcomes.121
However, even without this dormant Commerce Clause
argument, the jurisdictional effects would still discourage
economic growth.
The other possibility assumes that the corporation is not on
notice of the jurisdictional effects of registration. Under this
scenario, states implicitly concede that, while this does not
discourage business registration and economic activity,
corporations are not in fact on notice and therefore cannot give
consent to personal jurisdiction, either implicitly or explicitly.122
117. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1502; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 378; N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 53-17-20. This is not to mention that it is typically not advisable for a party
to engage in illegal conduct.
118. See supra Part III.A.
119. See generally supra Part III.A.
120. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Ford Motor Co., 458 P.3d 569, 578-580 (N.M. Ct. App.
2018) (holding the registration statute did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause); In re
Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., 2016 WL 2866166, at *5 (D. Kan. May 17, 2016)
(holding the registration statute violates the dormant Commerce Clause); Hegna v. Smitty’s
Supply, Inc., 2017 WL 2563231, at *5 (E.D. Pa. June 13, 2017) (holding the registration
statute does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause).
121. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 458 P.3d at 578-580 (holding the registration statute did not
violate the dormant Commerce Clause); In re Syngenta, 2016 WL 2866166, at *5 (holding
the registration statute violates the dormant Commerce Clause); Hegna, 2017 WL 2563231,
at *5 (holding the registration statute does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause).
122. See generally supra Part III.B.
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In either of these two possibilities, the state is either discouraging
economic expansion or implicitly admitting that the corporation
has no notice as to the jurisdictional effects of registering for
business.
This coercion poses a significant problem when considering
the validity of a company’s consent to personal jurisdiction.
While some level of government coercion may be acceptable in
some areas,123 the coercion experienced in the consent by
registration context is far more unreasonable in comparison.
Consider issuing driver’s licenses for instance; state governments
regularly impose restrictions and requirements on a person’s
ability to drive on public roads.124 However, that coercion
involves the state’s significant regulatory interest in maintaining
the safety of the state’s roads and its citizens.125 In this context,
the state does not have a significant regulatory interest in hearing
lawsuits involving any cause of action from residents of any
state.126
A state may have a regulatory interest in hearing lawsuits
involving its residents or involving conduct in its state, but the
consent here is not limited to lawsuits that involve a state
interest.127 Because the consent at issue here involves consent to
general jurisdiction and not specific jurisdiction, this coercion
appears especially unreasonable. This lack of notice and the civil
penalties and fines levied against non-registering companies
effectively coerce the company into registering with the state,
further questioning the validity of the business’s consent to
personal jurisdiction.128

123. See Alexander L. Mounts, A Safer Nation?: How Driver’s License Restrictions
Hurt Immigrants & Noncitizens, Not Terrorists, 37 IND. L. REV. 247, 249-50 (2003)
(discussing the requirements state governments impose for obtaining a driver’s license).
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. Monestier, supra note 43, at 1398 (“A state has no conceivable interest in
adjudicating a dispute that does not involve the state in any way or does not involve a
defendant who has made the state its home.”).
127. This argument is analogous to the evolution of Conflicts of Law, where courts
take a state’s policies and regulatory interests into account in examining whether to apply
that state’s law. See AARON D. TWERSKI & NEIL B. COHEN, CHOICE OF LAW 73-74 (2015).
128. See Monestier, supra note 43, at 1387-89.
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IV. CONSENT BY REGISTRATION CONTRAVENES
THE SPIRIT OF DAIMLER
No state’s registration statute solves every one of the abovementioned issues. Even Pennsylvania’s registration statute,
which requires express consent of registering businesses and
therefore avoids the notice issue, still fails to address the issue of
allowing parties to consent to general jurisdiction or the economic
and legal coercion that businesses may face in deciding to
register.129 However, even if every one of the outlined problems
had an implemented solution, consent by registration would still
contravene recent Supreme Court precedent.130
Just in 2011, the Supreme Court began limiting the scope of
general jurisdiction.131 This began with Goodyear, where the
Court articulated a strict definition of the contacts required for
general jurisdiction, requiring a domicile-like presence that
“render[s] [the corporation] essentially at home in the forum
State.”132 In 2014, the Court cemented this domicile-like
presence requirement, limiting where a corporation can be subject
to general jurisdiction to a discrete set of forums: the
incorporation state, its principal place of business, or where the
corporations activities “render [it] essentially at home in the
forum State.”133
These two decisions significantly narrowed the ability of
states to subject corporations to general jurisdiction. Professor
Tanya Monestier has argued that the recent shift “signal[s] a new
direction for general jurisdiction—and one where it will be
exceedingly difficult to establish general jurisdiction in
circumstances other than the two traditional bases: place of
129. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5301 (1981); see 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 411
(2015) (penalizing non-registered foreign corporations); see also supra Part III.A.
130. See Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 640 (2d Cir. 2016); Genuine
Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 148 (Del. 2016); see also Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 927 (2011); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S.
117, 137-39 (2014).
131. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919; see also Jack B. Harrison, Registration, Fairness,
and General Jurisdiction, 95 NEB. L. REV. 477, 478-79 (2016).
132. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919; see also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A.
v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416, (1984); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437,
438, (1952).
133. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137-39.
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incorporation and principal place of business.”134 Through these
decisions, the court implicitly rejects a corporation—even in the
most exceptional cases—being subject to general jurisdiction in
more than three states.135 In other words, this shift unequivocally
disavows a doctrine that subjects a corporation to general
jurisdiction in more than a few states and especially rejects a
doctrine that would allow a business to be subject to nationwide
general jurisdiction.136
Courts have taken notice of this shift with differing results.
A minority of courts have continued to permit consent by
registration.137 These courts generally continue to employ the
rationale used by pre-Daimler courts, arguing that whenever the
corporation registers and appoints an agent for service of process,
the corporation effectively consents to personal jurisdiction in
that state regarding any lawsuit.138 Following Daimler, these
courts further argue that no Supreme Court case overturns or
further addresses Pennsylvania Fire Insurance’s holding that
allowed consent by registration in the pre-International Shoe
era.139 In the absence of a direct overruling of Pennsylvania Fire
Insurance, courts have decided not to take it upon themselves to
overrule Supreme Court precedent, even in situations where it
seems warranted.140

134. Monestier, supra note 43, at 1357; see Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.19 (stating the
use of “at home” general jurisdiction on an out-of-state corporation will only occur in an
“exceptional case”); see also Monkton Ins. Servs. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014)
(stating it is “incredibly difficult to establish general jurisdiction in a forum other than the
place of incorporation or principal place of business” following Daimler).
135. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137-39.
136. See id. at 139; Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919-20.
137. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Ford Motor Co., 458 P.3d 569, 581 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018);
Mitchell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 159 F.Supp.3d 967, 979 (E.D. Mo. 2016); Acorda Therapeutics,
Inc. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 817 F.3d 755, 770 (Fed. Cir. 2016); AK Steel Corp. v. PAC
Operating Ltd. P’ship, No. 2:15-CV-09260-CM-GEB, 2017 WL 3314294, at *4 (D. Kan.
Aug. 3, 2017).
138. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 458 P.3d at 580-82; Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 817 F.3d at
766-67 (O’Malley, J., concurring); Mitchell, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 976.
139. See, e.g., Freedom Transp., Inc. v. Navistar Int’l Corp., No. 2:18-CV-02602-JARKGG, 2019 WL 4689604, at *18-20 (D. Kan. Sept. 26, 2019); see also Pa. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 96 (1917).
140. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Navistar, Inc., No. 18-CV-321-KG/KBM, 2019 WL
1024285, at *6 (D.N.M. Mar. 4, 2019) (noting “‘[i]f a precedent of [the Supreme] Court has
direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of

792

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73:4

However, lower courts that argue that they do not have the
authority to overrule Supreme Court precedent ignore specific
Supreme Court jurisprudence cautioning against continued
reliance on pre-International Shoe decisions. Since International
Shoe, the Court has expressed doubt as to the continued authority
of pre-International Shoe decisions, effectively disaffirming that
older precedent.141 Courts overruling the practice of consent by
registration have found that, while the Supreme Court has not
explicitly overruled Pennsylvania Fire Insurance, the Court has
functionally overruled the holding, considering both
International Shoe and the recent doctrinal shifts seen in
Goodyear and Daimler.142 These courts point out that even the
Supreme Court has cautioned against following pre-International
Shoe precedent “due to concerns that such cases were ‘decided in
the era dominated by . . . territorial thinking.’”143 The Supreme
Court has also warned that pre-International Shoe cases such as
Pennsylvania Fire Insurance “should not attract heavy reliance
today.”144 The Court’s recent decisions on personal jurisdiction
heavily imply the danger of following precedent that contrasts
with the spirit of current general jurisdiction doctrine.
The most influential case rejecting consent by registration
following Daimler is Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp.145 There,
the Second Circuit interpreted a Connecticut statute, determining
that consent by registration—especially where there was no
explicit consent—violated due process under Daimler.146 The
Brown Court concluded its Daimler due process analysis by

decisions, the [lower court] should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to [the
Supreme] Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.’”).
141. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 138 n.18 (2014).
142. See, e.g., Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 639 n.21 (2d Cir.
2016); DeLeon v. BNSF Ry. Co., 2018 MT 219, ¶ 22, 392 Mont. 446, 426 P.3d 1, 8.
143. DeLeon, 2018 MT 219, ¶ 22, 392 Mont. 446, 426 P.3d at 8 (quoting Daimler, 571
U.S. at 138 n.18).
144. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 138 n.18.
145. Brown, 814 F.3d at 640; see In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. No. VI, 384 F.
Supp. 3d 532, 539 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (citing Brown); Display Works, LLC v. Bartley, 182 F.
Supp. 3d 166, 176 (D.N.J. 2016) (same); Magna Powertrain de Mex. S.A. de C.V. v.
Momentive Performance Materials USA LLC, 192 F. Supp. 3d 824, 829 (E.D. Mich. 2016)
(same); Perez v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., No. 3:16-CV-00842-NJR-DGW, 2016 WL
7049153, at *8-9 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2016) (same).
146. Brown, 814 F.3d at 640-41.
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arguing that, because Daimler “rejected the idea that a
corporation was subject to general jurisdiction in every state in
which it conducted substantial business[,]” to permit consent by
registration would effectively circumvent Daimler’s holding.147
In allowing consent by registration, “Daimler’s ruling would be
robbed of meaning by a back-door thief[,]” as it could subject a
corporation to the power of any state where it registered.148
The Second Circuit noted that “a carefully drawn state
statute that expressly required consent to general jurisdiction as a
condition on a foreign corporation’s doing business in the state
. . . might well be constitutional.”149 But courts have even called
express consent statutes into question since Daimler.150
Following that decision, both the Pennsylvania Superior Court
and the Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania reexamined
whether consent by registration still comports with due
process.151 These courts have reached differing results.152 The
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, focusing on the coercive nature
of the registration statute, held that Pennsylvania’s statute
violated due process in light of Daimler.153 The court argued that,
while the corporation gave consent “knowingly,” the consent runs
the risk of not being “voluntary,” as the state conditions the ability
to conduct business on the corporation forgoing its due process
rights.154 Meanwhile, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has
affirmed the practice of consent by registration.155 However,
Pennsylvania state courts have increasingly begun reexamining

147. Id. at 640.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 641.
150. In re Asbestos Prods., 384 F. Supp. 3d at 543 (rejecting consent by registration);
but see Webb-Benjamin, LLC v. Int’l Rug Grp., LLC, 192 A.3d 1133, 1139 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2018) (affirming consent by registration).
151. See In re Asbestos Prods., 384 F. Supp. 3d at 534; Bors v. Johnson & Johnson,
208 F. Supp. 3d 648, 652-53 (E.D. Pa. 2016); Webb-Benjamin, 192 A.3d at 1139.
152. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab., 384 F. Supp. 3d at 534 (holding that consent by
registration, even with express consent, does not comport with due process following
Daimler); Bors, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 653 (holding that consent by registration does comport
with due process following Daimler); Webb-Benjamin, 192 A.3d at 1139 (same).
153. In re Asbestos Prods., 384 F. Supp. 3d at 541-43.
154. Id. at 538, 542.
155. Webb-Benjamin, 192 A.3d at 1139.
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this issue, with the Pennsylvania Superior Court hearing an en
banc reargument on the wisdom of consent by registration.156
Following Daimler, it would be inconsistent for courts to
continue the practice of consent by registration, even if the state
uses an express consent statute. Daimler declined to follow the
principle that a corporation is subject to general jurisdiction in
every state in which it does a significant amount of business.157
To allow consent by registration would make Daimler’s ruling
toothless, as a corporation would be subject to personal
jurisdiction in any state in which it is registered.158
Further, when considering the due process issues in
conjunction with the other issues with consent by registration, this
practice does not comport with the foundational principle of
fairness.159 As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court has deeply
rooted the concept of personal jurisdiction in “traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.”160 The Court even implicitly
emphasized these ideals of fairness and justice in preInternational Shoe cases before giving these ideals an explicit
role in personal jurisdiction.161 In the context of specific
jurisdiction, the Court has articulated specific factors for
evaluating the fairness of a court exerting personal jurisdiction
over a particular party.162 Time and again, the Court has declared
its adherence to the concepts of fairness, justice, and

156. See Murray v. Am. Lafrance, LLC, 234 A.3d 782, 785-87 (Pa. Super. 2020)
(granting an en banc reargument to examine whether to continue to allow consent by
registration but ultimately dismissing the appeal without addressing the merits due to waiver
of the issue by the defendant); see also K&L Gates LLP, En Banc Panel of the Pennsylvania
Superior Court Gets Set for Reargument Regarding Business Registration as Consent to
General Personal Jurisdiction, JD SUPRA (Oct. 28, 2019), [https://perma.cc/T2UX-PWRS].
157. See Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 640 (2d Cir. 2016).
158. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137-39 (2014).
159. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 319 (1945); see also WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
160. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940));
see also World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
161. See Effron, supra note 83, at 34-35, 43.
162. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (articulating four factors: (1) “the forum
State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute,” (2) “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief . . . at least when that interest is not adequately protected by
the plaintiff’s power to choose the forum,” (3) “the interstate judicial system’s interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies[,]” and (4) “the shared interest of the
several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies[.]”).
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reasonableness in the context of personal jurisdiction.163 But
some courts seem to ignore these concerns when practicing
consent by registration.
The Court’s personal jurisdiction law intertwines a sense of
“natural justice” with these ideals of fairness and
reasonableness.164 While the Court sometimes crafts complex
and seemingly convoluted specific jurisdiction tests, its
fundamental goal in these tests is to produce a fair result.165 If
courts have articulated fairness as the so-called “North Star” of
personal jurisdiction, then fairness should be the guiding principle
when examining personal jurisdiction.166 For example, instead of
viewing Goodyear and Daimler as purely limiting a court’s
authority in cases involving general jurisdiction, these decisions
could be seen as using fairness to correct the course of general
jurisdiction in today’s more global and interdependent world.167
In other words, in these decisions the Court recognized and
reaffirmed the role of fairness in personal jurisdiction in ruling a
business in today’s global economy should not be subject to
general jurisdiction in every state in which they do business.168
This concept implicitly recognizes that fairness is a fluid ideal—
that, even if the practice of consent by registration was fair in a
less interdependent and territorial-focused society, consent by
registration no longer conforms to the touchstone of fairness and
justice.169
When analyzing consent by registration under a fairness
framework, consent by registration is an inherently unfair
practice. As demonstrated throughout this Article, courts ignore
163. See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880 (2011); WorldWide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292; Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
164. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 730 (1877); Effron, supra note 83, at 34.
165. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291-92, 297 (applying a
“minimum contacts” test influenced by “purposeful[] avail[ment]” and “foreseeability”
despite articulating factors in evaluating fairness).
166. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
167. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137-39 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011).
168. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137-38; Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919; World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
169. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463); Brown v.
Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 632 (2d Cir. 2016).
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significant problems when using consent by registration. From
the broad nature of the consent, to the lack of notice and clarity in
registration statutes, to the probable coercion in obtaining a
business’s registration to the due process concerns following
Goodyear and Daimler, the practice of consent by registration
appears exceptionally unfair under a personal jurisdiction
analysis.170 While consent by registration could be seen as “fair”
for large corporations with vast resources, the practice still seems
unfair due to its uneven application depending on the state and its
impact to businesses without those vast resources.171 Why should
we ignore this paramount concern of fairness and justice when it
comes to personal jurisdiction obtained through consent,
particularly when that consent is predicated on dubious
presumptions and practices?
V. CONCLUSION
Courts reasonably want to use consent by registration, as the
practice allows businesses to be haled into court where the current
personal jurisdiction doctrine fails to confer the court
jurisdiction.172 But consent by registration is ultimately an unfair
conduit to obtain authority over parties, with problems such as the
broad nature of the consent, lack of clarity on the effects of
registration, the use of coercion to obtain registration, and the due
process concerns following Goodyear and Daimler.173 Instead of
using consent by registration, courts (with the Supreme Court’s
guidance) could expand the use of specific jurisdiction or stream
of commerce doctrine to correct the recent limiting of personal
jurisdiction.174 But courts should not continue to use consent by
registration to unfairly close the current jurisdictional gap. Doing

170. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137-39; Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919; World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
171. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 156 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
172. See id. at 143.
173. See id at 137-39; Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919.
174. See generally Trammell, supra note 31, at 502; Shane Yeargan, Purpose and
Intent: Seeking a More Consistent Approach to Stream of Commerce Personal Jurisdiction,
90 WASH. U. L. REV. 543 (2012).
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so would circumvent the spirit of Daimler and our framework for
due process and fairness.175

175. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137-39; World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.

